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IMMIGRATION OF HIGHLY SKILLED PROFESSIONALS:
DISCRIMINATION IN PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL?
Abstract
Are highly skilled foreign professionals paid differently than their native-born
counterparts?  To address this question, this study focuses on a particular profession with
substantial inflows of immigrants, in which human capital is readily transferrable:  Major League
Baseball (MLB).  Racial discrimination in professional sports has received considerable
attention, but it remains to be seen whether there has been differential treatment of foreign
athletes.  Focusing on a 1997-1998 sample of 557 MLB players, we find that foreign players are
indeed treated differently than native-born players, favorably in some respects and unfavorably
in others.  Moreover, when controlling for birthplace, the extent of racial discrimination must be
reconsidered.                     
JEL Codes: J61 (Immigrant workers)
J71 (Discrimination)
J30 (Compensation)
11.  Introduction
As labor markets become increasingly global in nature, an important question is whether
there are significant pay differentials between native- and foreign-born workers, other things
equal.  One source of pay differentials could be imperfect transferability of human capital.  A
common finding is that productivity and earnings are lower for new immigrants than natives, but
as immigrants assimilate to a host country the wage gap narrows and could even be reversed. 
Not surprisingly, myriad studies have endeavored to estimate the extent of labor market
assimilation.1  Another source of pay differentials may be discrimination against immigrant
workers.  If there are prejudices against foreigners, native workers could earn a pay premium
over similarly productive immigrants.  But perhaps discrimination varies with skill level.
Borjas (2005) has written that an inflow to the U.S. of foreign doctoral students results in
significantly lower earnings for all doctorates.  Turning the issue around, have highly skilled
foreigners been treated differently than their native-born counterparts?
It has been argued that highly skilled workers may be complementary to native-born
professionals; foreigners may be hired because skilled domestic workers are in short supply
(Bauer and Kunze, 2004).  Consequently, discrimination against foreign professionals might
seem unlikely.  Indeed, Barrett et al. (2000) report ed that immigration of skilled labor into
Ireland helped reduce earnings inequality in that country.  But a study by Goyette and Xie (1999)
of scientists and engineers suggests that immigrants are treated differently.  
Goyette and Xie reported that immigrant women are less likely to be (1) employed and
(2) promoted than immigrant men and native-born women.  They speculated (p. 407) that their
findings may be due to the “immigration path” taken by many female scientists and engineers, as
spouses of immigrant men.  Immigration path notwithstanding, are foreign-born professionals
treated differently than their native-born counterparts?  To address this question, this study
focuses on a particular profession with substantial inflows of immigrants, in which human
capital is readily transferrable:  Major League Baseball (MLB).              
2Kahn (2000b) has written that the sports business is an ideal “laboratory” for labor
market analysis.  For professional athletes it is possible to observe levels of both pay and
performance.    Moreover, there is substantial racial and ethnic diversity among athletes.  Indeed,
the issue of racial discrimination in professional sports has received considerable attention from
labor economists (see surveys by Kahn, 1991, 2000a, 2000b).2  But it remains to be seen whether
there has been differential treatment of foreign-born athletes.3    
Immigration research would be undermined if information about pre-migration human
capital is less accurate than for post-migration human capital.  Yet panel data often lack details
about immigrants’ proficiency in the host country language.4  To study potential discrimination
against skilled immigrants, the case of professional baseball provides several advantages.  
Major League Baseball operates franchises in the U.S. and Canada.  Detailed data are
available about a player’s performance, earnings, and personal characteristics (for example,
birthplace, age, experience, tenure, race); information is also available on product market
characteristics.5  Although there are opportunities to play baseball elsewhere, MLB is widely
regarded as the pinnacle of professional baseball and player salaries are higher than elsewhere. 
Baseball requires highly idiosyncratic skills, yet those skills are readily transferrable. 
Not surprisingly, there are substantial inflows of immigrants into MLB, especially from Latin
America. Although English language proficiency is not necessary to play baseball, when it
comes to bargaining with teams over pay, foreigners may be at a relative disadvantage.  So
although playing skills are easily transferrable, immigrants may be paid differently than native
players.    
Major League Baseball controls the number of franchises, limiting the number of teams
that can compete for players.  Between 1997 and 1998 MLB expanded from 28 franchises to 30.6 
Increasing the number of competitors for labor may affect salaries, which is why we concentrate
on the years 1997 and 1998.    
3In this study we test for pay discrimination against foreign-born professional baseball
players.  Our data set includes detailed observations on 557 MLB players.  We find that foreign
players are indeed treated differently than native-born players, favorably in some respects and
unfavorably in others.  Moreover, when controlling for birthplace, the extent of racial
discrimination must be reconsidered.  
2.  Data Sample
Baseball players specialize either as hitters or as pitchers.  A hitter can play regularly,
that is, most of the games played by his team in a 162-game season.  Pitchers, in contrast,
typically perform more intermittently.  Pitchers risk many different types of arm damage, so they
require frequent arm rest and usually do not pitch daily.  Because hitters can play more often, we
concentrate on them.  We want to focus on the treatment of regular players, not peripheral part-
timers.  Thus, we included in the sample only hitters who played at least half the time.7    
Given the criteria for inclusion, our sample comprises 557 hitters, 101 of whom (18.1
percent) are foreign-born (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics).  Of the 557 players in the
sample, 52.1 percent are black/Latino.  All of the immigrants are black/Latino, coming from
Latin America or the Caribbean (specifically, Colombia, Cuba, Curacao, Dominican Republic,
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Puerto Rico, Venezuela, and the Virgin Islands).8  
Salary, experience, performance, and position data for each player came from the
Lahman Baseball Database (www.baseball1.com).9  It is especially important to control for a
player’s experience because his contract status depends on that experience.  
The market for MLB players operates under different contract regimes.  A monopsonistic
regime applies to players with less than six years of MLB experience.  These relatively
inexperienced players are subject to a reserve clause, which constrains them to negotiate pay
only with the team that owns their exclusive contract rights.  The monopsony power conferred
by the reserve clause should hold down the salaries of novice players.  If foreign-born novices
suffer a relative disadvantage in bargaining, their pay could be especially low.      
4A competitive regime applies to players with six or more years of MLB experience. 
These relatively experienced players are eligible for free agency and can negotiate pay with any
MLB team.  Monopsony power effectively begins to erode, however, as early as the fourth year,
for then a player is eligible for final offer arbitration.  Arbitration rights can relieve players of
monopsonistic exploitation because arbitrators are free to award competitive salaries, which does
occur in practice.  Free agency (or eligibility for arbitration), other things equal, should boost
player salaries.    
 For both native- and foreign-born players in the sample, experience averages 7.18 years
(see Table 1).  Over 90 percent of native players are eligible for free agency or final offer
arbitration; for foreigners the ratio is 85 percent.  Not only are foreign and native players similar
in years of experience and contract status, both groups average roughly 2,500 career at bats,
meaning they have similar playing experience too.
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that foreign-born players tend to play different
positions than the native-born ones.  Foreign players are somewhat more likely to play infield
positions than natives (51 percent compared to 44 percent).  In contrast, natives are more likely
to be outfielders or catchers.  Foreigners also tend to play in larger metropolitan areas.  
A player’s hitting prowess can be represented by his career batting average (base hits per
at bat) or slugging average (total bases per at bat).  Base running acumen can be reflected by the
rate of base stealing (career stolen bases per at bat).  Despite playing different positions, native-
and foreign-born players exhibit strikingly similar hitting performances.  Mean values for career
batting average (0.270), slugging average (0.420), and base stealing (roughly 2 stolen bases per
100 at bats) are virtually identical between the two groups.   
Mean salaries are also similar between native and foreign players.  For 1997-1998, a
foreign player averaged $2.41 million in pay compared to $2.20 million for a native-born player.  
Given that all of the foreign-born players are black/Latino, it may be useful to compare
descriptive statistics with those of U.S.-born minority players (see Table 1).  Mean values for the
5experience and performance variables are comparable.10  Furthermore, mean salaries are 
roughly alike ) $2.41 million for foreigners, $2.31 million for native-born minorities. 
Given similar mean values for pay and performance, it is tempting to conclude that there
is no discrimination against immigrant players.  Similarly, it may be tempting to think that black/
Latino players, regardless of birthplace, do not suffer pay discrimination.  But just because
average pay and average performance are similar does not necessarily mean that foreign-born
players are treated just like their native-born counterparts.  More detailed analysis is needed to
see if players are rewarded differently. 
3.  Salary Regression Model
In other salary regression models estimated for professional baseball players, it is
common to estimate salary in terms of explanatory variables that reflect a player’s career
performance, personal characteristics, contract status, and characteristics of his team’s market.11 
Our specification closely follows the work of Kahn (1993a, 1993b), who analyzed the
determinants of MLB player salaries.  
As career performance measures we utilize commonly used variables like At bats, Batting
average (base hits per at bat), Slugging average (total bases per at bat), and Stolen bases (per
100 at bats).  Like Kahn, we also control for experience, contract status, Infielder status, Catcher
status, Race (1 if black/Latino, 0 if white), the team’s market area population and household
income.12  Tenure accounts for a player’s service with his team.  Designated hitter is a 0-1
variable that accounts for those players who specialize as designated hitters (1 if most games
played are as a designated hitter).  Given our 1997-1998 sample, we control for Season with a 0-
1 indicator variable (1 if 1998).  In addition to the other market characteristics, Canadian team is
a 0-1 variable to control for teams based in Canada.  Our innovation is to use an indicator
variable to control for a player’s Birthplace (1 if foreign-born, 0 otherwise).                   
Other things equal, there could be pay differences between native and immigrant players,
that is, there could be different intercepts by group.  There also could be group differences in
6slope coefficients.  For example, immigrant players may be treated differently according to
contract status:  foreigners subject to the reserve clause may be especially vulnerable in salary
negotiations.  Moreover, performance improvements by foreigners may be rewarded differently
than those made by U.S.-born players.  Because the immigrant ballplayers are also black/Latino,
it is important to distinguish between potential racial discrimination and birthplace
discrimination.
Given the types of salary equations estimated in other discrimination studies of
professional baseball, for the jth player at time t consider a specification of the form:
           k               k     
       lnSalaryjt = "0 +  G "iXijt + $0Racej +  G $i(Racej*Xijt) + gjt, (1)
        i=1         i=1     
where the Xs are the explanatory variables ) representing a player’s experience (and experience
squared), contract status, tenure with team (and tenure squared), position played, career
performance measures, characteristics of his team’s market ) and g is the disturbance term.  If
any of the $ coefficients is non-zero, black/Latino players are paid differently than white
players.  But because the foreign-born players are also non-white, we need to account for both
Race and Birthplace:    
           k          k       
       lnSalaryjt = "0 +  G "iXijt + $0Racej +  G $i(Racej*Xijt) +      
           i=1         i=1     
        k
    (0 Birthplacej  + G (i(Birthplacej*Xijt) + 0jt, (2)
      i=1
where 0 is the disturbance term.  If any of the ( coefficients is non-zero, other things equal
(including race), foreign-born players are treated differently than their native-born counterparts.   
4.  Estimation Results
To isolate the separate influences of Race and Birthplace, we begin by estimating
Equation (1), that is, we start by controlling only for Race.  Then we estimate Equation (2),
accounting for both Race and Birthplace.       
7Consider a control only for Race.  The estimated coefficients are reported in the left
column of Table 2.  The findings are similar to those reported in other studies.  Pay is directly
related to performance and experience.  There does not appear to be significant discrimination
against non-white players.    
As expected, players used more intensively earn significantly higher salaries.  Increasing
At bats by one standard deviation (19.603) increases lnSalary by 0.8037 points (19.603 x 0.041);
at the mean of lnSalary (14.047), adding 0.8037 points means adding more than $1.5 million to
yearly pay.  
Not surprisingly, better batting performance also results in significantly higher pay. 
Boosting slugging average by one standard deviation (0.0613) raises lnSalary by 0.3720 points;
at the mean of lnSalary, yearly pay rises more than $600,000.  A higher rate of Stolen bases also
means higher pay.  Starting at the mean of lnSalary, increasing the rate of base stealing by one
standard deviation adds nearly $270,000 to a player’s pay.    
The regression also indicates that pay increases at a decreasing rate with experience.  For
a player with average years of service, the Experience effect is positive.  Pay is unrelated to
tenure with team.  Other things equal, salaries for 1998 (the post-expansion year) were 10
percent higher than for 1997 (the pre-expansion year).  
It is baseball lore that catchers are especially important:  not only do they hit, they play a
vital defensive role in the field (as backstops) and are responsible for guiding pitchers. 
Controlling for performance and experience, there is a significant pay premium for being a
catcher, more than 30 percent.  Finally, salary is directly related to market size, although it is
relatively inelastic.       
The coefficient on the Race variable is negative but not significant at the five percent
level.  Other things equal, there is no apparent Race effect.  A couple of the interaction terms,
however, are significantly positive (Race x Batting average, Race x Catcher), suggesting that
Race could affect pay in other, more subtle ways.  But evaluating any so-called Race effects is
8problematic, for all of the immigrant ballplayers are also black/Latino.  Do any apparent Race
effects reflect differential treatment of foreigners?  
Controlling for both Birthplace and Race, we estimated Equation (2), reporting the
results in the right column of Table 2.  As one would expect, the coefficient estimates are nearly
identical for At bats, Slugging average, Stolen bases, Experience, Season, and the position
variables.  Once there are separate controls for Race and Birthplace, however, there are
distinctive pay differentials. 
The Race coefficient is significantly negative but the Birthplace coefficient is
significantly positive (see Table 2).  Furthermore, the Birthplace and Race effects are
offsetting.13  So controlling for factors like batting and base stealing performance, experience,
and position played, immigrant ballplayers earn the same as native-born white players. 
Moreover, immigrant players ) all of whom are black/Latino ) earn substantially more than
U.S.-born black/Latino players.  Using the mean of lnSalary as the reference point, ceteris
paribus, the difference would be $960,000.14 
Grouping black/Latino players together ) both foreign- and native-born ) Race does not
appear to have a significant impact on salaries, other things equal.  Controlling for Birthplace
shows otherwise.  U.S.-born black/Latino players earn less than other ballplayers, ceteris
paribus.  For these minority players there is a significant payoff for improving Batting average
or by being a Catcher.  Thus, to earn a similar salary as others, a non-white American must
exhibit a sufficiently strong hitting performance or play the vital Catcher position.    
Other things equal, foreign-born ballplayers are not paid less than native-born white
players.  Nevertheless, immigrant players suffer some disadvantages.  Immigrant ballplayers
tend to be concentrated in infield positions; the Birthplace x Infield term shows that foreign
infielders do indeed earn less than other players.  Foreigners are rewarded less for their playing
experience.  As reported in Table 2, the return to an extra year of experience is smaller for
foreigners than U.S.-born players.  Furthermore, their pay is significantly related to their contract
9status.        
Immigrant players are particularly hurt by the reserve clause.  Unlike native-born players,
graduating from the reserve clause is quite lucrative for the foreigners.  Once an immigrant
player qualifies for final-offer arbitration, ceteris paribus, he experiences a significant pay
increase.  Starting with the mean of lnSalary for a player subject to the reserve clause, graduation
to Arbitration-eligible status results in a doubling of pay (roughly from $226,000 to $452,000).15 
Qualifying for free agency also substantially boosts immigrants’ salaries.  Passing from
Arbitration-eligible status to Free agent status means a tripling of pay (roughly from $590,000 to
nearly $1,767,000).16   
Release from the reserve clause provides a substantial payoff to foreign-born players but
not domestic ones.  Evidently, in the early years of their careers immigrant ballplayers are at a
relative bargaining disadvantage.  
5.  Concluding Remarks
In a study of native-immigrant wage differentials in western Germany, Lang (2000)
reported that there was discrimination against ethnic Germans from eastern Europe but not those
from eastern Germany.  But human capital varied in Lang’s sample, especially language skills. 
Focusing our attention on highly skilled professionals with readily transferrable skills, Major
League Baseball (MLB) players for the years 1997-1998, we find that foreign-born players are
indeed treated differently ) unfavorably in some respects, favorably in others.
Immigrant ballplayers subject to MLB’s reserve clause, ceteris paribus, suffer bargaining
disadvantages.  Once salaries for foreigners are competitively determined, their pay jumps
dramatically.  Nevertheless, foreigners earn smaller returns to years of service than native-born
players.  Future efforts should attempt to isolate the source(s) of the initial bargaining
disadvantage, whether immigrants have weaker “fall-back” positions or suffer in the negotiating
process.  If immigrants are indeed less skillful negotiators, that may help to explain why they
realize relatively small returns to extra years of experience.
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In other studies research of immigrant earnings, researchers have been unable to control
for changes in employer monopsony power.  Our analysis of professional baseball shows that
relaxation of monopsony power does matter.  As contractual structure changes ) that is, as
ballplayers graduate from the reserve clause to arbitration eligibility or free agency ) the salaries
of foreign-born players increase substantially.  Thus, it is important to control for labor market
structure when estimating the marginal effect on immigrant earnings of time spent in the host
country.         
Finally, our study is relevant for research on racial/ethnic discrimination.  Previous
studies of professional baseball generally have not found significant Race effects on player
salaries.  But those earlier studies did not control for possible Birthplace effects.  Our analysis
shows that in a racially diverse labor market with both native- and foreign-born workers, it is
crucial to distinguish between the effects of  Race on salary and those of Birthplace, particularly
when Race and Birthplace are correlated.  Other things equal, U.S.-born blacks/Latinos earn
significantly less than other ballplayers, including foreign-born blacks/Latinos.    
Unlike Lang, our study has focused on highly skilled professionals with readily
transferrable human capital.  And unlike Lang, we find more pronounced discrimination against
a domestic racial/ethnic group than an immigrant group.  Future research should seek to identify
why treatment of non-white ballplayers varies by birthplace. 
The majority of U.S.-born ballplayers are white; likewise, the majority of foreign-born
players are black/Latino.  Other things equal, these “majority group” players are paid more than
the “minority group” of U.S.-born blacks/Latinos.  Perhaps differential tastes for discrimination
(by team owners or team-mates) contribute to this differential treatment.  Or maybe the process
of discovering and assessing talent differs between “majority” and “minority” groups.  Perhaps
that is why “minority group” players are rewarded more than others for good performance (for
example, the Race x Batting average effect).
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Beyond the case of baseball, we would expect future studies to focus on other
professional sports (like soccer, basketball, or ice hockey) to see if there are salary
(dis)advantages for foreign athletes.  And beyond sports, we would expect research to focus on
other skilled occupations, including those professions where language skills are important.
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Notes
1.  On immigrant assimilation, see the pioneering works of Borjas (1985, 1987),
Chiswick (1978, 1980), Chiswick et al. (1997), and Chiswick and Miller (1985); also see Borjas
(2002a) and Borjas et al. (1996).  Borjas (1990, 1994, 1995, 2002a, 2002b) has discussed how
the assimilation process may be  hampered if cohorts of immigrants are increasingly less skilled;
also see Cohen et al. (1997) and Duleep and Regets (1997).  For earlier surveys of immigration
research, see Borjas (1994) and Greenwood and McDowell (1986).
2.  Research on racial discrimination in professional sports includes analyses of salary, as
well as discrimination in hiring and retention discrimination and discrimination by playing
position (see the surveys by Kahn, 1991, 2000a, 2000b).  Salary discrimination has been the
most studied issue.  The primary method used to test for racial discrimination in pay involves a
regression of log salary on a vector of performance indicators, team and market characteristics,
and 0-1 indicator variable for race.  In Major League Baseball, there is little evidence of
significantly positive salary premia for white players.
3.  While there has not been research on wage discrimination against immigrant athletes,
Jones et al. (1999) studied discrimination in the National Hockey League by Canadian teams
against French-speaking players.  
4.  McManus et al. (1983) demonstrated that a potentially large portion of the native-
immigrant worker wage gap can be accounted for by differences in host country language
proficiency.
5.  With the exception of Daneshvary (1993) and Bucci and Tenorio (1997), past studies
of birthplace discrimination generally have not controlled for industry, occupation, or the degree
of employers’ monopsony power.  But the appearance of non-discrimination may mask
discrimination across particular industries and occupations.  Controls for occupation or industry
are also important because they may proxy unobserved human capital.  Finally, estimates of
wage discrimination could be confounded by the influence of any employer monopsony power.
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6.  In 1997 and 1998 two franchises were operated in Canada; the rest were in the U.S.
7.  Specifically, to be included in the 1997 (1998) sample, a hitter must have played in at
least 81 of a possible 162 games in 1996 (1997).  
8.  Following previous studies of discrimination in professional baseball, we inspected
Topps baseball cards for 1997 and 1998 to infer a player’s race.  According to our playing
criteria, 563 players could be included in the sample, but we omitted 6 foreign-born white
players (3 observations from Canada, 2 from Australia, 1 from Germany).  Given only 6 data
points for foreign-born white players, there are not enough observations to separate the potential
influences of race and birthplace on their salaries.  
9.  The salary information is the dollar value of contractual earnings for the particular
year, which includes the value of any bonuses.  Information is not provided about contract
length.
10.  One exception is in the rate of base stealing.  Native-born black/Latino players
average 3.70 stolen bases per 100 at bats, compared to a rate of 2.16 for the foreign players.  The
minority groups do differ according to position played.  Native-born black/Latino players tend to
be outfielders (63 percent), but foreign-born black/Latino players tend be infielders (51 percent).  
11.  For example, see studies by Bodvarsson and Pettman (2002), Kahn (1993a, 1993b,
2000a), Marburger (2004), and Miller (2000).   
12.  For U.S.-based teams, metropolitan area population and per-capita income data are
available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (www.bea.gov).  For Canada-based teams, the
same data are available from Statistics Canada (www.statcan.ca); we converted into U.S. dollars
the per-capita income figures for the Canadian metropolitan areas.
13.  A Wald test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the Race and Birthplace
coefficients sum to zero (F-statistic = 0.015).   
14.  Starting at the mean of lnSalary, 14.047, the Race effect pushes lnSalary down to
11.983 ($160,011); the Birthplace effect boosts lnSalary to 13.928 ($1,119,060), meaning a
14
difference of $959,049.
15.  Offer status adds 0.692 points to lnSalary (see Table 2).  Starting at the mean of
lnSalary for reserve clause players, 12.449, and then adjusting for Race and Birthplace, the Offer
effect pushes lnSalary from 12.330 ($226,387) to 13.022 ($452,254).  
16.  Free Agent status adds 1.097 points to lnSalary (see Table 2).  Starting at the mean
of lnSalary for Offer-eligible players, 13.407, and then adjusting for Race and Birthplace, the
Free Agent effect leads lnSalary to jump from 13.288 ($590,072) to 14.385 ($1,767,364).
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics.
FULL
SAMPLE
   (557 players)
NATIVE-
BORN
(456 players)
FOREIGN,
MINORITY
(101 players)
NATIVE,
MINORITY
(189 players)
VARIABLE Mean
(Std. Dev.)
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
Salary 
($ millions)
          
          2.225        
         (2.202)
          2.196
         (2.178)
          2.409
         (2.328)
          2.311
         (2.463)
Experience
(Years)
   
          7.181
         (3.840)
          7.180
         (3.824)
 
          7.178
         (3.836)
 
         7.275
        (3.998)
Tenure w/team
(Years)
          2.346
         (2.751)
          2.390
         (2.820)
          2.196
         (2.405)
 
         2.132
        (2.551)
Race (=1if 
          minority)
          0.521           0.414
         
Birthplace (=1
      if non-U.S.)
          0.181
Free agent (%)           0.618           0.614           0.645           0.619
Arbitration-
eligible (%)
            0.280           0.296           0.206             0.291
At bats
(Career, 100s)
        24.841  
       (19.603)
        24.725
       (19.603)
 
        25.139
       (19.299)
        26.276
       (21.026)
Batting avg.
(Career)
          0.270       
         (0.022)
          0.270
         (0.023)
          0.270
         (0.020)
          0.274
         (0.021)
Slugging avg.
(Career)
          0.418
         (0.061)
          0.419
         (0.060)
 
          0.416
         (0.069)
          0.422
         (0.062)
Stolen bases
(Career, per
100 at bats)
          2.363       
         (2.334)
          2.408
         (2.452)
          2.157
         (1.699)
          3.701
         (2.873)
Infielder (%)           0.454           0.441           0.514           0.275
Outfielder (%)           0.364           0.377           0.308           0.630
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Table 1 (continued).  Descriptive Statistics.
FULL
SAMPLE
   (557 players)
NATIVE-
BORN
(456 players)
FOREIGN,
MINORITY
(101 players)
NATIVE,
MINORITY
(189 players)
VARIABLE Mean
(Std. Dev.)
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
Catcher (%) 
          
          0.118           0.125             0.084           0.026  
Designated
Hitter (%)
   
          0.063           0.055
 
          0.103 
 
          0.069
Income per
capita
($ thousands)
         27.746
         (3.627)
         27.763
         (3.500)
        27.755
         (4.114)
 
        27.797
         (3.407)
Metro
population 
(millions)
          5.584
         (4.727)
          5.359
         (4.558)
          6.400
         (5.262)
        
          5.737
         (4.967) 
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Table 2.  Determinants of Player Salaries.†
Dependent variable:  lnSalary
(t-ratios in parentheses; *significant at 5%)
VARIABLE Eq.(1):
Race effects only 
Eq. (2):
Birthplace and Race
effects
Birthplace 1.945*
(1.97)
Race -1.354
(-1.75)
-2.064*
(-2.31)
Birthplace x
Free agent
 1.097*
(2.37)
Race x
Free agent
0.315
(0.90)
0.017
(0.04)
Birthplace x
Arbitration-eligible 
0.692*
(2.31)
Race x
Arbitration-eligible
0.078
(0.37)
-0.073
(-0.32)
Birthplace x
(At bats x 100)
0.007 
(0.62)
Race x
(At bats x 100)
0.003
(0.39)
0.003
(0.23)
Birthplace x
Batting average
-0.879
(-0.20)
Race x 
Batting average
6.061*
(2.01)
6.719*
(1.95)
Birthplace x
Slugging average
-2.014
(-1.23)
Race x 
Slugging average
-0.309
(-0.26)
0.344
(0.25)
Birthplace x 
Stolen bases per 100 at bats
-0.089
(-1.91) 
Race x 
Stolen bases per 100 at bats
0.004
(0.13)
0.029
(0.89)
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Table 2 (continued).  Determinants of Player Salaries.†
Dependent variable:  lnSalary
(t-ratios in parentheses; *significant at 5%)
VARIABLE Eq.(1):
Race effects only 
Eq. (2):
Birthplace and Race
effects
Birthplace x
Experience
-0.364*
(-2.69)
Birthplace x
(Experience)2
0.018*
(2.72)
Race x
Experience
-0.150
(-1.48)
-0.049
(-0.45)
Race x 
(Experience)2
0.005
(0.89)
-0.0004
(-0.07)
Birthplace x 
Tenure
0.066
(0.98)
Birthplace x 
(Tenure)2
-0.002
(-0.25)
Race x 
Tenure
0.077
(1.86)
0.040
(0.85)
Race x
(Tenure)2
-0.005
(-1.59)
-0.003
(-0.91)
Birthplace x
Infielder
-0.389*
(-2.24)
Race x 
Infielder
0.125
(0.96)
0.219
(1.56)
Birthplace x
Catcher
-0.572
(-1.65)
Race x 
Catcher
0.473*
(2.40)
0.684*
(2.07)
Birthplace x 
Designated hitter
-0.538
(-1.58)
Race x 
Designated hitter
0.079
(0.31)
0.259
(0.93)
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Table 2 (continued).  Determinants of Player Salaries.†
Dependent variable:  lnSalary
(t-ratios in parentheses; *significant at 5%)
VARIABLE Eq.(1):
Race effects only 
Eq. (2):
Birthplace and Race
effects
Free agent 0.244
(0.91)
0.247
(0.92)
Arbitration-eligible 0.154
(0.96)
0.152
(0.94)
At bats x 100 0.041*
(8.34)
0.041*
(8.24)
Batting average -2.092
(-0.91)
-2.072
(-0.90)
Slugging average 6.068*
(6.54)
6.068*
(6.47)
Stolen bases per 100 at bats 0.076*
(2.89)
0.076*
(2.86)
Experience     0.411*
(5.15)
0.411*
(5.08)
(Experience)2 -0.027*
(-6.40)
-0.027*
(-6.33)
Tenure 0.044
(1.55)
0.044
(1.54)
(Tenure)2 -0.002
(-0.77)
-0.002
(-0.74)
Infielder 0.121
(1.17)
0.121
(1.16)
Catcher 0.312*
(2.24)
0.309*
(2.19)
Designated hitter 0.162
(0.87)
0.157
(0.84)
lnMetro population 0.094*
(1.94)
0.077
(1.62)
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Table 2 (continued).  Determinants of Player Salaries.†
Dependent variable:  lnSalary
(t-ratios in parentheses; *significant at 5%)
VARIABLE Eq.(1):
Race effects only 
Eq. (2):
Birthplace and Race
effects
lnMetro income per capita -0.200
(-0.58)
-0.187
(-0.54)
Canadian team -0.123
(-0.75)
-0.139
(-0.84)
Season 0.100*
(1.96)
0.108*
(2.14)
Constant     9.942*
(3.08)
10.063*
(3.15)
Number of observations 557 557
Mean of dependent variable 14.047 14.047
Adjusted R2 0.768 0.772
F-statistic
(overall significance of
regression)
60.43* 42.82*
†For each equation, the White test rejects the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity.  Thus,
each equation is estimated with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and
covariance.
